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Addressing Systemic Issues in the WTO:
Lessons from the Singapore Issues
Erick Duchesne*

Introduction
In 2001, the World Trade Organization (WTO) launched an
ambitious round of global trade talks named after Doha, the city
where the Round got under way. The major aims of the Doha
Development Agenda are to advance the “built-in agenda” left
over from the Uruguay Round, namely to liberalize trade in services and agricultural products; to further reduce tariffs on industrial goods; to address institutional governance and systemic
issues facing the WTO; and most importantly, to address pervasive development-related features of trade. As part of this
*
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agenda, the Doha WTO Ministerial meeting made a so-called
“soft launch” of the Singapore issues:1 a formal work program
and expanded consultations on trade facilitation, transparency in
government procurement, the relationship between trade and
investment, and the relationship between trade and competition
policy, with the final decision on the inclusion of these issues in
the negotiations to have been made at the 5th WTO Ministerial
meeting in Cancún in September 2003. This latter objective
proved to be too ambitious: The stock-taking at Cancún ended
when a group of developing countries led by India, Brazil, and
South Africa and including China (the so-called G20) walked
out of the negotiations in protest over proposed investment
rules. Although the main divide was in the farm subsidy negotiations, the Singapore issues became the “official” culprits for
the untimely termination of the Ministerial.2
However, the breakdown at Cancún does not necessarily
signal derailment of the WTO negotiations. Some progress was
made at Cancún, including the first indication of preparedness
to deal with the Singapore issues individually rather than as a
package. Moreover, work goes on in Geneva and capitals to
forge consensus on the framework for the negotiations (target
date: end-July 2004) and there are indications in the flurry of
“mini-Ministerials” that WTO members are primed to politically jumpstart the trade talks following the 2004 American
presidential elections and changes in the EU Commission, if not
before. The present hiatus in negotiations thus provides opportunity to reflect on the “bien fondé” of the Singapore issues.
This chapter evaluates the pros and cons of keeping the Singapore issues on the Doha Round negotiating agenda, not in
terms of trade theory, which focuses on the economic welfare
1

The Singapore issues take them name from the first WTO Ministerial
meeting in Singapore in 1996 at which working groups on these issues were
mandated
2

For early reactions to the Cancún collapse, see The Economist, “The
WTO Under Fire”, September 20, 2003. Chapter 1 of this volume surveys
the state of play post-Cancun with the benefit of further reflection.
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gains from trade, but through the lens of International Regime
Theory (IRT), which emphasizes the gains from cooperation.
International regimes enhance cooperation among sovereign nations in various ways, including by: "lengthening the
shadow of the future", altering the payoffs of a game, institutionalizing the rules of cooperation and defection, providing information to members, reducing transaction costs, facilitating
issue linkages, and deflecting domestic lobby pressures. With
the gradual, on-going change in emphasis of the WTO from
trade liberalization to more contentious rule making, IRT suggests three specific questions about the inclusion of the Singapore issues in the negotiations:
(a) Does the WTO, as a by now fairly well established, successful international regime facilitate the development of international cooperation in these issue areas?
(b) Looking at the flip side of this coin, would keeping these
issues on the negotiating agenda constitute a potential stumbling block for the Doha Development Agenda? Or do they
enhance the chances of a successful deal by expanding the
feasible set of win-win outcomes (taking into account technical assistance and capacity building to help developing
countries implement and benefit from these rules)?
(c) Is the effective “unbundling” of these issues and differentiation in their individual timetables that was signalled at
Cancún for the better or for the worse?
This chapter next reviews the negotiating history of the Singapore issues. It then discusses the WTO's evolution as an international regime in terms of the major functions of such regimes as identified in the IRT literature before turning to a consideration of whether bringing these issues into the WTO regime enhances the possibility of increasing international cooperation in these issue areas. The final section interprets the developments at Cancún in light of the preceding analysis.
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Background & Negotiating History of the Singapore Issues
Traditional trade theories are ill equipped to shed light on what
occurred at the Cancún WTO Ministerial meeting since the discussions were less about liberalization of trade than about the
rules of the international trade and investment game.3 A trade
agreement appeals to governments if it offers greater welfare
than would be realized in the absence of such agreement.4 But
the general consensus amongst economists that trade liberalization has an overall net positive impact on welfare (albeit with
unclear implications for income distribution) might not apply
seamlessly to rule making.
For almost fifty years following the Second World War, the
focus of trade liberalization was the reduction or elimination of
discrimination against foreign products. The process was
straightforward: members of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), which subsequently evolved into the WTO,
agreed not to take trade-restricting actions against their trade
partners in exchange for reciprocal undertakings from their
trade partners. By and large, the undertakings (a) were framed
in terms of policy instruments (tariffs) that could be measured
(i.e., they applied to transparent forms of trade protection); (b)
were limited to border measures (giving rise to the characterization of deepening of trade relations in this era as "shallow integration"); and (c) involved restrictions on public policies (i.e.,
they specified what governments would not do), as opposed to
commitments to implement specific public policies (i.e., specifying what governments must do).
3

Truth be told, multilateral trade negotiations began to touch on domestic regulatory policies in the Kennedy Round. The Tokyo Round is just as
much known for the various codes that it introduced as for the tariff cuts it
agreed. Nevertheless, until the Uruguay Round, negotiations on non-tariff
issues represented a few items out of a larger agenda. In the Doha Round—
agriculture excepted—the focus has been on intrusive regulatory issues.
4

Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, 1999, “An Economic Theory of
the GATT,” American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No 1. pp. 215-48.
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The commitments that underpin shallow integration still
form the bedrock of the international trade system, but the new
areas of negotiations involve undertakings that would demand
reforms of domestic economic regulation, including in the case
of the Singapore issues, competition law, rules governing foreign direct investment (FDI), government procurement policies
and approaches, and customs and related procedures for processing imports. Reaching consensus on these regulatory issues
is more difficult because it involves (in some cases farreaching) commitments to restructure domestic laws and regulations—that is to say, "deep integration". Moreover, the change
in negotiating issues also involves a radical change in negotiating approach from an exchange of comparable reductions in
protection (which left economic regulatory frameworks different) to different degrees of change towards a common regulatory regime (e.g., adopting the same regime for intellectual
property rights involved little or no change for the US and the
EU but radical changes for developing countries).
Writing well before Cancún, Hoekman and Kostecki provided a clairvoyant outlook on the difficulties that the evolution
of the WTO agenda portended for the Doha Round:
Multilateral negotiations on non-border policies, administrative procedures and legal regimes have proven
to be much more complex than traditional trade policy
talks. It is much more difficult, if not impossible, to
trade ‘concessions’ – instead the focus revolves around
the identification of specific rules that should be
adopted. The disciplines that are proposed by some
countries may not be in the interest of others. Given
disparities in power and resources, to a large extent
negotiations on rules can be expected to reflect the
agenda of high-income countries (and specific interest
groups in these countries). In contrast to traditional
trade liberalization, the rules that emerge in a given
area may not be consistent with the development priorities of low-income countries. No longer is it the
case that ‘one size fits all’ is necessarily a good rule.
5

With the gradual demise of tariffs and the ever greater
prominence of non-tariff, domestic regulatory policies
– standards, investment regulations, environmental,
social, or competition norms – there is a danger of
moving away from positive sum (‘win-win’) games
towards zero sum situations.5
The growing reaction to this shift in international economic
policy-making has sparked what some have termed a crisis in
global governance.6 There are two focal points for this sense of
crisis: the friction caused by the intrusion of international rules
into domestic policy-making, which is manifest in the grassroots anti-globalization movement;7 and the splintering of international cooperation, which is manifest in the collapse of the
negotiations at Cancún and the parallel surge of activity in ne5

Bernard M. Hoekman and Michel M. Kostecki, 2001, The Political
Economy of the World Trading System, 2nd ed., New York, Oxford University Press, p. 482.
6

See for example, Daniel Drache and Sylvia Ostry, "From Doha to
Kananaskis: The Future of the World Trading System and the Crisis of Governance", in John M. Curtis and Dan Ciuriak (eds.), Trade Policy Research
2002 (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Ottawa,
2003): 1-31.
7

Critics of globalization argue that domestic regulatory power is being
constrained by international agreements and/or decisions of international
bodies (such as the WTO's dispute settlement body) that are not elected or
otherwise lack democratic legitimacy. They are alarmed about growing lobbying power of corporations as globalization drives consolidation of businesses and thus greater industrial concentration, with particular concerns
being voiced about the ability of multinational firms to lobby for favourable
tax or regulatory treatment/changes. Others reply that the system is not broken; community and consumer interest groups can effectively use domestic
advocacy and consultative processes to get their views reflected at the global
level. They urge activists to work "within the system". They note that a
growing number of countries are exercising influence on the tenor or the
multilateral negations, thus giving an increasing voice to their constituents.
As Sylvia Ostry has argued, such pluralism in global governance “is not only
desirable, it is essential to sustaining and extending the rules-based system."
(Ostry’s emphasis). See, Sylvia Ostry, 1997, The Post-Cold War Trading
System: Who’s on First? Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p. 239.
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gotiating bilateral preferential (i.e., discriminatory) agreements.
While the Singapore issues have helped to sail the WTO into
the eye of both storms, it is the latter that is of interest here.
Box 1 summarizes the substantive aspects of these issues in
the WTO negotiations.8

Box 1: Substantive aspects of the Singapore Issues in WTO negotiations
Trade and investment. Key negotiating subjects and principles include:
 Negotiating modality: similar to commitments on services trade under
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), commitments on
investment would be for specified matters ("positive list" approach),
rather than in terms of broad commitments subject to listed exceptions.
 The balance between the interest of exporters of investments with those
of importers of investments.
 Countries’ rights to regulate investment.
 Development-related issues, including technical cooperation with international organizations such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
 The public interest and individual countries’ specific circumstances.
 The scope and definition of various issues namely: transparency, nondiscrimination, exceptions, and balance-of-payments provisions.
Trade and competition policy. The Doha Declaration instructed the working
group to clarify the following:
 Core principles, including transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness
 Provisions with respect to “hardcore cartels” (i.e. those formally set up).
 Modalities for voluntary cooperation on competition policy among
WTO member governments
 Support for progressive reinforcement of competition institutions in
developing countries through capacity building, including through cooperation with organizations such as UNCTAD.
Trade facilitation. The Doha Declaration identifies the following issues:
 Ways to expedite the movement, release and clearance of goods in transit.
 Technical assistance and capacity building to assist developing countries
8

For more information, see WTO, "The Doha Declaration explained",
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm.
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to implement an agreement on trade facilitation.
Transparency in government procurement. Separate from the plurilateral
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA).
 Negotiations are to be limited to the transparency aspects and therefore
the scope for countries to give preferences to domestic supplies and
suppliers will not be restricted.
 Development issues such as technical assistance and capacity building.

Why, it might be asked, did the WTO take on these issues?
In the first place, they drill down into domestic regulatory space
and thus raise governance issues. Moreover, being non-tariff
measures (NTMs), they tend to be far more complex than reciprocal tariff reduction.9
The first of these issues is at the heart of the longstanding
divide on the status of the Singapore issues in negotiations that
is reflected in the annual reports of the working groups submitted to the General Council of the WTO. The European Union
and, to a lesser extent, the United States have been proponents
of opening formal negotiations; they have received significant
support from partners within the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). At the other end of the
9

For example, there is no true and tested way to determine whether a
non-tariff measure genuinely constitutes a protectionist barrier to international commerce versus a necessary element of domestic economic regulation in any given developmental context. Second, the lack of a simple metric
to quantify the value of concessions further reduces the chances of reaching
an agreement on a reciprocal package involving NTMs. Third, unlike tariffs,
NTMs are often "lumpy" (e.g., a measure might either be in place or not,
with no in-between); this makes it difficult to calibrate concessions to match
reciprocal offers and complicates a process of incremental liberalization.
Fourth, unlike tariff cuts, the liberalization of NTMs may require reforms to
domestic institutions, which can challenge the implementation capacity of
developing countries. Tariff negotiations have also become complex. Early
GATT/WTO rounds involved item-by-item concessions. Across-the board
cuts were introduced in the Kennedy Round, based on a simple linear 50
percent tariff cut. More complex formulae have since been introduced (e.g.,
the "Swiss" formula currently in vogue) as have and zero-for-zero negotiations. For a full discussion of reciprocal tariff reduction formulae, see
Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, pp. 122-35.
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spectrum, some WTO members, typically developing and least
developed countries10, maintain that the case has not been made
clearly as to the benefits of introducing such rules into the multilateral system at this time.
To complicate matters, India and some others argue that
there is no clear indication in the Singapore Declaration that the
Singapore issues fall under the single undertaking prescription.
This latter principle, first introduced in the Uruguay Round
agreement, stipulates that virtually every item of the negotiation
is part of a whole and indivisible package. Some argue that discussion of the status of Singapore issues under the single undertaking requirement should only be addressed in the context of
formal negotiations thereon.
Considering the difficult task of defining the contours of the
Singapore issues for negotiation purposes, it came as no surprise to most observers of the WTO that the Cancún Ministerial
meeting failed to reach consensus on whether to initiate formal
negotiations on them. However, there were important developments at Cancún: the Singapore issues were effectively "unbundled" in view of the first sign of flexibility from the EU and
other key players.11 Each issue must now be considered on its
10

While this chapter distinguishes between developing and leastdeveloped countries, it should be acknowledged that there are no WTO definitions of “developed” and “developing” countries. The designation of developing country is derived from a process of self-selection by certain WTO
member states and this is not automatically accepted in all WTO bodies. The
WTO recognizes the designation of least-developed countries for some of its
members in accordance with the United Nations’ classification. Unless a
clear distinction between “least developed” and “developing” countries is
essential, this study will often use the term “developing countries” to refer to
both of these latter categories.
11

On the last morning at Cancún, Pascal Lamy, the EU’s chief negotiator, offered to give up the two most controversial Singapore issues, competition policy and investment, but by then it was too late to salvage the remaining two issues. On this aspect of the negotiating dynamic at Cancún see Pierre Sauvé, "Decrypting Cancún", paper prepared for an "Ad Hoc Expert
Group Meeting on the Post-Cancún Agenda for WTO Trade Liberalization
and Its Implications for Developing Economies", United Nations' Economic
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own merits.12 Some indication of the chances for movement on
the individual issues can be inferred from a compromise proposal made by the facilitator for these issues at Cancún, Canada's then-Minister for International Trade, Pierre Pettigrew.
Under this proposal, trade facilitation and transparency in government procurement would form part of the Doha Round, implying optimism about the chances for early forward movement.
Investment rules would be handled in parallel negotiations with
no terminal date, suggesting a possibly slower time path. Competition policy would be subject to "the Doha Round”.
As efforts to revive and advance the Doha Round proceed,
the shape of the negotiating package—what is to be on the table
and what is not—remains uncertain. Against this background,
we now consider what political science theories of international
regimes say about how well placed the WTO is to address these
issues.
The WTO through the lens of International Regime Theory
Multilateral cooperation among sovereign nations in the absence of a central authority is explained by political scientists in
terms of the concept of an "international regime" which, in
Krasner’s classic definition, is “a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of internaand Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, 18-19 November
2003, manuscript, at section (ii) "The Singapore issues: convenient culprits?"
12

The modified EU position is expressed in European Commission,
“Singapore issues – Options post-Cancún,” Ref. 514/03, Brussels, 30 October 2003. [http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/Cancún/docs/EC-Sing-IssuesPost-Cancún.pdf]. The desirability of addressing the Singapore issues on
their individual merits is strongly supported by several developing countries.
See World Trade Organization, Trade Negotiations Committee “The Doha
Agenda: Towards Cancún”, Communication from Argentina, Botswana,
Brazil, China, Columbia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,
TN/C/W/13, 6 June 2003, p. 3.
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tional relations.”13 How does the WTO stack up in terms of the
features that make an international regime useful?
Lengthening the Shadow of the Future.
A regime lengthens the shadow of the future by creating an
expectation among the players that they will interact with each
other over an indefinite time horizon.14 This allows for a “giveand-take” process where the players make incremental
concessions and evaluate the behaviour of their counterparts
over the long run. This feature of an international regime
suggests the utility of a “go slow” approach in the
implementation of new rules to allow all parties to test the
willingness (and/or ability) of member states to follow up on
any agreements.
The history of the multilateral trading system illustrates well
this aspect of an international regime. The series of multilateral
negotiations under the GATT/WTO since 1947 furnished
learning and reputation-building processes that allowed nationstates to discriminate between “cooperators” and “defectors”
and to adjust their concessions accordingly. The results speak
for themselves: eight rounds of trade liberalization have been
successfully completed, lowering the average tariff from 40
percent at the beginning of the process to about 4 percent with
full implementation of the Uruguay Round cuts; trade has
13

Stephen D. Krasner, 1983, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables” in Stephen D. Krasner ed., International Regimes, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, p. 2.
14

Readers who are familiar with the Prisoners’ Dilemma situation in
game theory will recognize that an outcome of mutual cooperation is more
likely in a repeated game than in a “one-shot” game, where mutual defection
is the rational outcome (i.e., a unique Nash equilibrium) under the usually
specified decision rule of risk aversion. The emergence of cooperation in an
iterated trade and investment game under the aegis of an international regime
follows the same logic. For more discussion on the Prisoners’ Dilemma, especially in its iterated version, see among others Robert Axelrod, 1984, The
Evolution of Cooperation, New York, Basic Books.
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expanded much faster than global economic activity, more than
tripling the share of trade in global GDP. While there are many
exceptions to its rules and many remaining examples of
protectionism in the world, the current international system is,
compared to other historical periods, in many respects the freest
by far.15
An incremental approach where tractable issues are
addressed first, paving the way for initiatives to address ever
more difficult matters, is also a trademark of the GATT/WTO.
Such an approach provides an opportunity to observe the
consequences of liberalization and to adjust gradually to the
new demands of the international economic regime. The
GATT/WTO experience adds support to neofunctional theorists
who argue that establishing some degree of cooperation as a
foothold, however limited, is critically important for long run
cooperation.
By lengthening the shadow of the future, an international
regime such as the WTO facilitates a gradual breakdown of the
resistance to multilateral disciplines in new issue areas.
Altering the Payoffs of a Game.
An international regime can make cooperation or conflict more
or less likely by altering the payoffs of a game through "side
payments" to participants. In the multilateral trade context,
technical assistance to help developing countries to implement
and take advantage of trade agreements constitutes such a form
of payoff alteration. Such side payments were in fact central to
the launch of the Doha Development Agenda.
In economic terms, these side payments are made feasible
by the gains from trade realized by the major trading nations
that provide or finance the assistance. Their interest in expanding the game leads them to "prime the pump", as it were, to induce wider participation. The role of the international regime is
15

For extensive details on trade openness and structure of trade, see
Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, pp. 9-18.
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to help overcome the problem of "collective action" implicit in
trade-related technical assistance. Any single trading nation
cannot capture the benefits from technical assistance that expands the multilateral trade of another country; accordingly, it
has no interest in providing such assistance alone. The international regime, however, allows it to capture a share of the overall gain that is, in principle, commensurate with its contribution.
Institutionalizing the Rules of Cooperation and Defection.
International regimes institutionalize rules and norms. This increases the probability of cooperation in two ways. First, participants in a system tend to "internalize" norms; this is in fact a
central tenet of legal theory, which holds that most people, most
of the time, observe the law, even in circumstances where the
threat of punishment is absent. Second, a regime can supplement such internalization by making clear what is a defection
and prescribing commensurate remedies/penalties.
The history of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism serves to illustrate both aspects. If a member of the WTO
believes that another is illegally raising barriers to trade, it can
lodge a complaint under the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which contains explicit rules for determining if
a defection has occurred. If fault is found, the complainant is
authorized to retaliate to an extent that a WTO panel judges to
be commensurate with the injury. In WTO parlance, “retaliation” is a “withdrawal of concessions”; typically, this involves
the raising of tariffs on a specific quantum of imports as authorized by the WTO.
The current WTO DSU builds on earlier, and by general
reputation much weaker, versions of dispute settlement during
the GATT era. The GATT system allowed, until 1989, the appellant to block the formation of a panel to review the case. After "improvements" to the system in 1989, an appellant could no
longer block the formation of a panel but could still block the
adoption of the panel's report, meaning the system still lacked
real teeth. The WTO DSU removed the ability of the appellant
13

to block adoption of a panel report since a blocking motion required "negative consensus"—i.e., all members of the WTO had
to agree not to adopt. Thus, as Busch and Reinhardt put it:
The conventional wisdom is that the GATT’s diplomatic norms have been supplanted by the WTO’s more
legalistic architecture, resulting in a system in which
“right perseveres over might.” 16
Yet, as Busch and Reinhardt go on to show, the GATT-era
dispute settlement mechanism was, surprisingly, very "efficacious", yielding concessions to the complainant in two-thirds of
the cases brought.17 Since many of these cases involved powerful rich countries making concessions to poor countries that
lacked the market power and institutional capacity to impose
effective sanctions, compliance with the GATT rules appears to
reflect the normative power of the regime itself.
At the same time, the progressive strengthening of
GATT/WTO dispute settlement in terms of enforceability testifies to the importance of a "stick" to ensure compliance when
internalization of norms is insufficient. The rapid expansion of
the case load of the WTO's DSB since its introduction is seen as
having been induced by the increased assurance that a victory at
the panel stage would lead to concrete enforcement action.
This principle of international regimes suggests that ideally
the dispute settlement mechanism would have a role with respect to each new article of the WTO charter.

16

See Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, "The Evolution of
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement" in John M. Curtis and Dan Ciuriak (Eds.),
Trade Policy Research 2003 (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade, 2003): 143-183; at p. 143.
17

Ibid. at p.154.
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Providing Information to Members
One of the most important functions of a regime (perhaps surprisingly so) is to provide information about the behaviour of
members covered by the regime as well as about their national
policy objectives. This information reduces the costs for individual members of monitoring each other's compliance and, by
regularly confirming continued cooperation of others, fosters
cooperation by all. Information also reduces uncertainty; this is
important because uncertainty often causes cooperation to break
down unnecessarily.
The WTO fulfils this function of an international regime in
a number of ways.
First, it provides a forum for continual communication between member states. For example, WTO members gather regularly in specialized committees, working parties, working
groups, and Councils, at various levels of government, including officials and formal Ministerial meetings, to exchange information and views. This regular interaction is an efficient
mechanism to promote cooperation and to avoid potential conflicts.
In addition, under WTO transparency rules (which are featured in most of the agreements)18, members are required to
make public their domestic trade regulation. Further, the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) provides for regular monitoring of the behaviour of WTO members; importantly, the
highly detailed TPRM reports on member compliance with the
rules of the regime enable small and relatively poor countries to
determine whether others are cooperating or defecting, something they could ill afford to do independently.19
18

The GATS, the GATT, the Agreement on Rules of Origin, the
Agreement on Import Licensing, the Agreement on Customs Valuation, and
the Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights all
contain provisions related to the transparency of domestic procedures.
19

The need for transparency during the Doha negotiations is a recurring
theme for developing countries. See for instance “The Doha Agenda: Towards Cancún”, p. 1.
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Reducing Transaction Costs
Regimes increase the probability of cooperation by reducing
transaction costs. For example, in order to reach an agreement,
many procedural issues have to be resolved: a location has to be
selected; a list of invitees must be determined; various protocols
(e.g., where people sit) must be established; decision rules for
choosing policies must be agreed upon. All these choices or decisions, which must be dealt with prior to broaching substantive
talks, represent overhead costs of doing business in the cooperation game. By establishing rules and decision procedures at the
start, regimes reduce the cost of all subsequent agreements. In
other words, regimes deliver cooperation on the cheap.
In addition, there are major cost savings through the "network externalities" offered by a successful institution. For example, between N countries, there are N(N-1)/2 bilateral relationships. While these costs are distributed (no single country
has more than N-1 relationships to tend), the cumulative costs
across the system grow rapidly as N rises, increasing the overall
benefits of a multilateral agreement that covers all at once.
The GATT/WTO's history of repeated negotiations and
steady expansion of membership speak for themselves in illustrating the first aspect of this function of an international regime. The established modalities/protocols for negotiations/accessions combined with the acquired institutional memory of the practical aspects of these processes facilitate progress. Moreover when a new problem is encountered (e.g., how
to include Hong Kong as a customs territory), the solution can
be repeated (e.g., for Chinese Taipei).
As for the network externalities, these have become significant. Amongst the 147 WTO members20, there are 10,731 bilat20

As of April 23, 2004 with Nepal’s accession. See World Trade Organization, “WTO membership rises to 147”, WTO News, 23 April 2004,
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news04_e/wto_147members_23apr04_e
.htm
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eral relationships. Adding the 30 current observers (a country
must begin accession negotiations within five years of becoming an observer) would expand that number by nearly 5,000.
The more members, the greater the efficiency gains from transacting business through the regime compared to outside it, as
shown by the rise in the ratio of the number of bilaterals to the
number of members as the latter number expands.

Original GATT
Current WTO
Current WTO + observers

Number of
Members
23
147
177

Total number Ratio: Bilaterals
of bilaterals
to members
253
11
10,731
73
15,576
88

In view of the powerful incentives to forge agreements at
the multilateral level, a comment is required on the proliferation
of regional and bilateral negotiations.
The answer lies partly in the realities of economic geography: most nations transact most of their international commerce
with their immediate neighbours—that is why regional agreements are in fact regional. The advantages offered by regional
agreements have been well documented.21
21

Regional trade agreements (RTAs) allow the participating countries
to extract a good portion of the potential gains from trade in terms of production and distributional efficiencies. Negotiating results can be achieved faster
than is typically possible multilaterally and integration can be deeper. Speed
can be of the essence in some cases where governments seek to “lock-in”
domestic economic reform. RTAs have other advantages as well. They can
serve as a testing ground, pioneering the approaches later adopted multilaterally; this was the case with dispute settlement procedures developed in the
Canada-US free trade agreement that were later incorporated in the dispute
settlement framework adopted in the Uruguay Round. By the same token,
experience gained in negotiating RTAs can prepare countries (especially
developing countries) for the multilateral stage. And by creating broader
zones of harmonized rules at the regional level, RTAs can speed-up subsequent progress at the multilateral level. Finally, a thought-provoking recent
article provides an empirical test of rent seeking, in which the author demonstrates under which conditions state leaders might logically prefer to negotiate regional rather than multilateral trade agreements. See Kerry Chase,
2003, “Economic Interests and Regional Trading Arrangements: The Case of
NAFTA,” International Organization, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 137-74. At the

17

The answer also lies partly in the governance-related diseconomies of scale faced by organizations. These diseconomies
appear to become significant once the membership of an organization much exceeds the number of an ideal dinner party—
as the Geneva tradition of restaurants lending their names to
particular negotiating alliances or "like-minded" groups attests.
The discontent that has surfaced within the WTO about the
"green room" and "mini-Ministerial" processes 22 both highlights the difficulties of negotiating amongst 147 members at a
time, which inevitably cause the action to shift to smaller
groups, and the governance issues thereby raised.
Finally, the perspective on cost-benefits is quite different
for a major economy such as the US or the EU versus for a
small economy negotiating with one of these two, each of which
accounts for a considerable share of the world economy. There
are clear advantages for the US to deal one-on-one with smaller
trading partners for whom access to the huge US market is a
major factor; these advantages are manifest in the US' ability to
obtain greater concessions in terms of trade-related intellectual
same time, they have costs. Proliferation of RTAs creates a complex web of
preferential tariff rates and rules of origin that divert trade, reducing the
overall gains from trade. Empirically, the benefits from such arrangements in
terms of trade creation and acceleration of liberalization are considered to
outweigh the costs; at the same time, the proliferation of RTAs has made
multilateral liberalization, which tends to narrow the margin of preferences,
all the more important. For a recent survey, see John M. Curtis, "The Importance of Being Multilateral (especially in a regionalizing world)" in John M.
Curtis and Dan Ciuriak (eds.) Trade Policy Research 2003 (Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Ottawa, 2003): 43-71.
22

Some delegates from developing nations openly lament the lack of
democracy within the WTO itself. They remark that the ‘green room’ process, where a small invited group of members meets informally behind closed
doors to work out areas of agreement which are then presented to the rest of
the membership as a fait accompli, and the use of ‘invitation only’ miniministerial meetings relegate plenary sessions to ‘mere sideshows’ where
most important decisions are already endorsed by powerful delegations. See
Mark Lynas, “Playing Dirty at the WTO,” The Ecologist, June 2003
[http://www.theecologist.org/archive_article.html?article=411&category=55].
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property and capital movement in bilateral agreements with
Singapore and Chile than has proved possible in the WTO.
The outcome of this interplay between the regional and
multilateral trade regimes is unclear.
Facilitating Issue Linkages
Regimes facilitate issue linkage. Sometimes cooperation on one
issue is difficult but linking the issue with another increases the
possibility of cooperation. For example, if a game is essentially
zero sum, there is no basis for cooperation, only rivalry. However, if two zero sum games are linked, it becomes possible to
trade losses in one game for wins in the other. Depending on the
valuation of the respective gains and losses in the two issue areas, the linked games can yield positive sums for both players.
In other words, linkage can create a zone of mutual benefits
where none exist when the issues are handled separately.
The WTO illustrates this property of a regime particularly
well. For example, in the Uruguay Round, linkage between the
negotiations on trade-related intellectual property rights
(TRIPs), agriculture and textiles helped create a package outcome that satisfied all parties. Linkage has in fact become an
essential feature of trade liberalization: following the mandated
launch of negotiations on agriculture and services as per the
"built-in agenda" agreed in the Uruguay Round, it was generally
agreed that a new round would have to be launched to sufficiently broaden the set of trade-offs to create the basis for final
agreements in these two issue areas.
Linkage is clearly an important consideration with respect
to the Singapore issues—they were after all linked as a group
from the time of their entry onto the WTO agenda at the 1996
Singapore Ministerial until the meetings at Cancún. How they
will fit into the negotiating agenda post-Cancún—if at all—
remains to be seen. Developing countries had insisted on sub-
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stantial progress on issues within the “development agenda”23 in
order to consider movement on the Singapore issues, insofar as
they were willing to countenance them at all.
Linking issues can also complicate matters—indeed, the
"poison pill" is an example of the use of linkage as a tactic to
block progress. Insofar as the constituency for the Singapore issues remains hard to identify (e.g., why was Japan adamant on
their inclusion in the round to the point of risking collapse of the
talks?), a good case could be made for “de-linking” the Singapore
issues from the Doha Round.
The future of the Singapore issues on the Doha agenda will
depend on the concessions that the developing economies might
be ready to make to keep some or all of these issues off the table—or alternatively, the concessions that the developed economies might consider to keep them on the table.
Deflecting domestic lobby pressure
An interesting and controversial feature of international regimes
is the way governments use them to deflect unwelcome pressure
from their domestic lobbies. Domestic reforms that have distributional consequences—e.g., removal of a subsidy—are notoriously difficult to make in the face of spirited opposition from
vested interests. Nothing is more convenient than to have such
a subsidy made illegal under an international agreement to
which the nation is party. By the same token, the intrusiveness
of international rule-making into domestic governance has become a persistent source of controversy surrounding interna23

If we were to define the development agenda as issues where developing countries hope to make particular gains, a non-exclusive list would include concessions under the TRIPs agreement for particular health issues
(especially HIV), expanded trade-related technical assistance, special and
differential treatment in specific circumstances, and addressing concerns
related to implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements. This would be
course in addition to basic market access objectives for agriculture, industrial
goods and services as well as strengthened disciplines on subsidies and the
use of anti-dumping and countervailing duties.
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tional institutions under the general rubric of the so-called "democratic deficit". Accordingly, use of this feature of an international regime increasingly risks attracting as much pressure as it
might deflect.
Hoekman and Kostecki eloquently describe this feature of
the WTO as an international regime: “The WTO is somewhat
analogous to a mast to which governments can tie themselves so
as to escape the siren-like calls of various pressure-groups.”24 In
most countries, diverse groups exhibit dissimilar trade preferences. The configuration of protection at any given time is the
product of the interplay between demand for protection expressed by various interest groups and the supply offered by
responsive governments, which itself is influenced by the lobby
pressure from export-intensive industries that stand to benefit
from reciprocal liberalization. While governments might objectively prefer welfare-enhancing trade liberalization policies over
sustaining the rents of protection-seekers, political calculation
might dictate otherwise. The GATT/WTO can help solve the
political economy problem by “empowering the exporters”25
while allowing national governments to “tie their hands”
through binding multilateral agreements to reduce the effective
supply of protection. Insofar as the WTO enhances trade among
nations, few analysts would find fault with this—indeed,
Hoekman and Kostecki present this feature in a very favourable
light. But would this judgement be carried over to the WTO's
involvement in rule making?
There is no easy answer. To the extent that the rules enshrined in WTO agreements represent good practice, irrespective of circumstances, the multilateral trade regime represents
both a good model to build towards and a useful support to lean
on while getting there. Unfortunately, there are no guarantees
that negotiated rules are welfare-enhancing for all, as the WTO
24

Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p. 29.
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To borrow a term popularized by Michael J. Gilligan, 1997, Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation, and Collective Action in American
Trade Policy, Ann Arbor, Michigan University Press.
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agreement on trade-related intellectual property (TRIPs) has
served to illustrate.
It is also more complicated to understand and deal with the
dynamics of interest groups on rules issues. When it comes to
investment and competition, it is apparent that multinational
corporations favour a seamless web of rules, but the lobbies on
the other side of the equation are not necessarily the traditional
protection-seekers. The structure of trade consultations thus is
forced to evolve to reflect the broader interests involved.26
Here we have to carefully distinguish between the situation
where governments lean on the WTO agreements to push
through reforms they believe are in the interests of their own
country and cases where the rules are more or less "forced" on
them. Modern China is often cited as an example where the
government is said to be purposefully using the WTO agreements to overcome domestic opposition to the market-based
regulatory framework that it is putting in place. Developing
countries committed to putting in place regulatory regimes to
enforce intellectual property rights are often cited as an example
of the latter, where the rules are not self-evidently in the country's interests and were adopted under pressure, as the lesser evil
to being outside the WTO and exposed to unilateral trade sanctions with no procedural protection from the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism. Unfortunately, it is not possible from the
public record to know which circumstance prevails--in both instances, the government claims that its hand was forced!
Insofar as the framework of rules enshrined in the WTO
agreements do not represent optimal policies for all—and the
risk of this would most likely be highest for countries at an
early stage of industrialization—this aspect of the WTO as an
international regime could potentially have some negative con26

The evolution of Canada's system of trade consultations is described
in Dan Ciuriak, " Canadian Trade Policy Development: Stakeholder Consultations and Public Policy Research", Chapter 6, in John Curtis and an Ciuriak, 2005, Trade Policy Research 2004, Ottawa, Minister of Public Works
and Government Services Canada.
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sequences. Accordingly, even if the WTO were deemed to be a
successful regime according to the other six criteria discussed
above, it might still meet with legitimate criticism on this score.
This issue is likely to play a prominent role in the case of the
Singapore issues, which are not seen as high priority items for the
poor countries. Insofar as they remain on the agenda and are part
of the final Doha Round agreement, there will be much ex post
analysis of the pros and cons of this role of the WTO.
Summary and future considerations
On the basis of the foregoing, one could safely argue that the
GATT/WTO has so far been a successful international regime.
In textbook fashion, it has "lengthened the shadow of the future" by creating stable expectations about the conditions under
which trade will take place; it has altered the payoffs to the
trade and investment game in a positive direction; it has institutionalized the rules of cooperation and defection, thereby promoting compliance with its rules; it has provided extensive information to its members to enable them to monitor the behaviour of their fellow members, reducing uncertainty about compliance and thereby fostering greater compliance by all; it has
reduced transaction costs of negotiating treaties on international
commerce; it has facilitated issue linkage, thereby expanding
the feasible set of cooperative deals; and it has provided a
credible international framework that governments have been
able to use to deflect domestic lobby pressures to push through
desired reforms.
Measures of its success abound: the vast expansion of the
activity which it oversees; the seven-fold expansion of its membership; the growth in stature and power of its institutions; the
large number of treaties concluded under its umbrella (including
the eight rounds with their various component agreements as
well as the telecommunications and financial services agreements); the many hundreds of disputes that have been brought
to it for settlement, the majority of which have resulted in set23

tlement with concessions being made; and the growth of its
reputation to actually larger than life status.
The pragmatism and flexibility which the multilateral system
has shown in accommodating political pressures are arguably responsible for the long life of the GATT/WTO, which started as a
provisional regime that, in the eyes of its founders, would last at
most a year or two.
But while the foregoing has emphasized the GATT/WTO's
successes as an international regime, there is also a liability
column in the GATT/WTO ledger.
Most importantly from a forward-looking perspective, there
has been no clear record on its watch of success in integrating
developing countries into the global economy or "putting trade
into development": the rhetoric of the day holds that the problem with globalization for the poor countries is that they are excluded from it—yet many have long been GATT/WTO members. The perception of lack of benefits from the Uruguay
Round, the occasion on which many poor developing countries
joined the club, was in fact a contributing factor to the collapse
of the Cancún Ministerial as it conditioned their unwillingness
to enter into negotiations in new rules areas. While it may be
unfair to lay the burden of the blame entirely on the
GATT/WTO,27 it has been a factor in creating a separate trading
context for developing countries since the 1970s when it introduced systematic discrimination into the trading system through
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP),28 has long been
27

If we consider the fact that several least developed countries, mainly
from Sub-Saharan Africa, have no resident representatives in Geneva, it is
hard to believe that they could have had an informed grasp of the intricacies
of their WTO obligations when they signed on. The creation of the Advisory
Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) at the Seattle ministerial meeting was a step
in the right direction, but even taking resource constraints into account part
of the responsibility for engaged participation in the Doha Round must come
from the members themselves. International NGOs have tried to step into the
breach and offered advisory services to the poor countries, but their tactical
advice at Cancun has been criticised by some trade professionals.
28

The GATT Contracting Parties first authorized a GSP scheme in
1971 through a 10-year waiver to Article I (most-favoured-nation clause) of
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involved with technical assistance to developing countries to
help them take advantage of the trading system, and has played
an advocacy role on behalf of trade liberalization. Whatever it
has done in these regards has not obviously consistently borne
fruit.
Notably, it is the small poor developing countries, which in
theory should be the major beneficiaries of the rules-based
framework provided by the WTO, that account for most of the
disappointments in taking advantage of globalization through
trade.
Equally notably, the two major trade and development success stories of the past decade or so—China in light manufacturing and India in services—forged their successes either entirely outside the framework of the WTO (China joined only in
2001, long after it had become a major trading nation) or
through openings driven by commercial innovation rather than
negotiated reduction of protection (India's exports of services
through outsourcing did not spring into life due to GATS-driven
liberalization and thus are in fact vulnerable to protectionist
measures as the backlash against outsourcing builds).
Meanwhile, the expansion of its membership is both testament to the GATT/WTO's success and a complication of its life
going forward. According to Hoekman and Kostecki, the governance issues posed by the expanded membership might be
among the WTO’s greatest challenges: “How the members
manage to shift from a ‘traders club’ to a multilateral organization in which 141-plus countries express their views and defend

the Agreement, in response to a 1968 recommendation made by the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). A subsequent
decision of the Contracting Parties on 28 November 1979 (26S/203) titled
"Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries", created a permanent waiver. For further
background see UNCTAD website. Many analysts today have come to
blame the plight of developing countries on the special and differential
measures afforded by the multilateral rules, arguing that accepting the full
disciplines of GATT/WTO rules would have promoted better performance.
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their interest will determine the relevance of the WTO to its
poorer countries.”29
Furthermore, past negotiations have left a substantial implementation “overhang” that burdens the current round of negotiations. Developing countries still struggling to comply with
obligations undertaken in the Uruguay Round would rather
clear the overhang and deal with the simple core issue of market
access before embarking on new rules negotiations; this militates against new rules issues making it onto the Doha agenda.
The innovation of the Single Undertaking to close the Uruguay Round has had the probably unanticipated consequence of
making the launch of negotiations on new issues more difficult:
without an “opt-out” option, members are much more cautious
about agreeing to have an issue put on the WTO negotiating table than they were under the previous regime. By the same token, members also need to pay close attention to internal political considerations at an early stage of the bargaining game.
Finally, as some observers have pointed out, the change in
form of the regime from an "agreement" in the GATT era to an
"organization" in the WTO era—and one tagged with a name
that many find distant, opaque and connoting power, and thus
ominous—may have something to do with the fact that the
WTO has been a lightning rod for protest where the GATT was
not. As is often the case, the WTO may in some ways be the
victim of its own success. Bearing that thought in mind, we
now turn to a more detailed consideration of the pros and cons
of including the Singapore four in the Doha Round.
The “Singapore issues” under International Regime Theory
In this section we consider the four issues on an individual basis, in order of probability of advancing in the near term.
Handicapped this way, we look at trade facilitation, government
procurement, trade and investment and trade competition policy
in turn.
29

Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p. 385.
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In terms of the seven functions of international regime theory discussed above, two are primarily relevant at the level of
the overall regime: namely, "lengthening the shadow of the future" and institutionalizing the rules of cooperation and defection. These pertain to the negotiating framework and the enforcement of rules. The remaining five functions, however, apply at the specific issue level.
Trade Facilitation
Trade facilitation is the least complicated of the Singapore issues to fit into an international regime framework.
The preparatory work for negotiations has centred on articles V (Freedom of Transit), VIII (Fees and Formalities Connected with Importation and Exportation), and X (Publications
and Administration of Trade Regulations) of the 1994 GATT,
which address transparency requirements and reducing transactions costs by expediting the movement, release and clearance
of goods. These are classic roles for an international regime.
In terms of deflecting pressures, the WTO as an international regime would at best play a minor role on this issue
While an inefficient border does provide some protection for
domestic import-competing industries, it is an inefficient form
of protection: it simply generates a dead-weight loss on society
by raising the costs of trade, as opposed to tariffs that generate
revenues for government or quantitative restrictions that create
specific rents for particular domestic interests.30 To be sure,
30

Allan Sykes has addressed the issue of "efficient protection" in his
paper "Promoting Efficiency through WTO Rule-making", presented at the
conference Efficiency, Equity and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Center for Business and Government, Harvard University, June 1-2, 2000. The idea is that the WTO removes "distortions" from
the multilateral system through its preference for fewer instruments of
greater transparency and predictability, and for instruments that have fewer
and less deleterious welfare effects -- i.e., non-discriminatory tariffs and subsidies (which create transfer payments) in lieu of quotas or regulatory restrictions, which raise rivals' costs and create dead-weight losses through expensive compliance procedures.
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border controls can be manipulated to provide specific protection (e.g., slowdown of seasonal goods through arbitrary inspections) and thus can generate rents; however, there are no domestic constituencies in favour of the general form of inefficiency.
Conversely, business is exerting substantial pressure on the
WTO to act in this area. Organizational and technological advances over the last decades have led to greater specialization
and geographic fragmentation of supply chains in production.
As a result production inputs can sometimes cross a border several times at different stages of production before reaching their
final destination. Delays in crossing national boundaries impose
costs on businesses that are part of such integrated production
networks,31 especially those relying on “just in time” delivery in
the post “September 11” era.
Consequently, any agreement leading to improved customs
clearance procedures, harmonized tariff nomenclatures, mutual
recognition of product standards and/or certification procedures
would represent an efficient step in reducing transaction costs.
Because of the generally non-controversial nature of improved
efficiency at the border, one would not expect governments to
have to lean on the WTO in order to push through reforms.
At first blush, accordingly, trade facilitation seems to constitute a “win-win” situation. Yet, current talks on this topic are
not sailing as smoothly as one might expect. The perceived inability by developing countries to implement a WTO customs
valuation agreement constitutes an impediment to a successful
negotiation. Developing countries also “have doubts about the
31

M. Doran (1999, “The Simpler Trade Procedures Board” quoted by
World Trade Agenda, Geneva) reports that customs-related transaction costs
can represent between 2 and 10 percent of a shipment’s value. Case studies
in a number of developing countries and transition economies suggest that
unofficial payments may raise the marginal tax rate on imported products by
more than 25 percent (M. Kostecki, 2000, “DHL Worldwide Express: Providing Just-in-time Services Across Borders in Central and Eastern Europe,”
in Y. Aharoni and L Nachum, eds., The Globalization of Services: Some
Implications for Theory and Practice, New York, Routledge). Both studies
cited in Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p. 435.
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value of accepting additional mandatory obligations on trade
facilitation given weak institutional structures, lack of modern
communication and information systems, inadequately trained
staff, and so forth.”32 At the same time, development advocates
question the allocation of scarce public resources to trade facilitation given competing urgent requirements in health, education
and social services.
These factors create an opportunity for the WTO as an international regime to play a positive role in moving liberalization
forward in the sense that gains to be made from cooperation on
regulatory issues create the basis for side payments in the form
of technical and capacity building assistance for least-developed
countries which face practical implementation problems.
Transparency in Government Procurement
There is little disagreement that transparency in public procurement conveys benefits.33 Yet, some question the value and
the necessity for a multilateral agreement in this rules area.34

32

Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p. 440.
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Benefits that have identified from a future multilateral agreement on
transparency in government procurement: (a) innovation amongst bidders
stimulated by enhanced competition; (b) better value-for-money for governments and budget savings from more competitive bidding; (c) stimulus for
formation of partnerships between local and foreign suppliers (especially
important for developing countries trying to develop their markets); (d) reduced corruption as a welcome side-effect for all; (e) entrenchment of good
governance which is essential to economic development; (e) establishment
of a minimum set of rules applicable world-wide that would have the effect
of introducing legal certainty to existing procurement procedures (f) attraction of more international bidders and foreign investment. See Report (2003)
of the Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement to the
General Council. http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_searchResult.asp
34

Colombia, Peru, Cuba and the Philippines have raised questions in this
regard. See World Trade Organization, Working Group on Transparency and
Government Procurement – Report on the Meeting of 18 June 2003 – Note
by the Secretariat, 7 July 2003 (WT/WGTGP/M/18 para. 20 and para. 22).
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The WTO already has a plurilateral agreement involving 28
members on government procurement.35 It contains disciplines
on discrimination against foreign products or suppliers in government procurement involving purchases above threshold levels that vary by level of government (with lower thresholds in
the case of central governments.). Key provisions concern
transparency of laws and tendering procedures, and provisions
for challenge of procurement decisions by aggrieved private
bidders seeking redress for decisions they believe were made in
a manner inconsistent with the rules of the agreement.
The process launched at Doha is quite separate from the
GPA. Its scope is limited to transparency, together with development-related objectives, including technical assistance and
capacity building; it does not contemplate restrictions on preferential treatment to local suppliers in allocating government acquisitions. However, unlike the GPA, it is to be part of the single undertaking.
There are also questions about how well prepared the
ground is on this issue. For example, agreement has yet to be
reached on the definition of transparency;36 and views are also
divided on the scope of the agreement (goods only or including
services and concessions) as well as on its relationship to other
WTO agreements and procedures (e.g., several developing

35

The first Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) was negotiated during the Tokyo Round and entered into force on 1 January 1981. The
present GPA, negotiated in the Uruguay Round and taking effect 1 January
1996, expanded coverage 10-fold expansion, including to services (e.g., construction), and to procurement by sub-national government and public agencies (including public utilities). See: World Trade Organization, "Understanding The WTO: The Agreements; Plurilaterals: Government procurement", http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm10_e.htm,
accessed April 24, 2004.
36

This is a valid argument considering that many WTO members are
hesitant to enter into negotiations without understanding all of its significance. Many of them are still uncertain in regards to the obligations they
have negotiated during the Uruguay Round.
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countries contend that the agreement should not be subject to
domestic review procedures or dispute settlement37).
Considered from the perspective of international regime
theory, if the majority view is correct that the benefits would far
outweigh the outlays associated with the introduction of transparency regulations for countries that do not have a procurement system,38 negotiations on this issue would set up the possibility of side-payments to change the payoffs of the game: this
could be accomplished, for example, through a richer technical
assistance and capacity building package. A sufficiently rich
offer of side-payments might induce agreement to legally binding provisions which would hasten the realization of benefits in
this area.39
However, given the practical implementation concerns of
developing countries, international regime theory further suggests that “less” might turn out to be “more” in this negotiation.
Given the long-term success of the GATT/WTO as an international regime, and taking account of the neo-structural view of
the long-term importance of establishing an initial level of cooperation, however minimal, an initial multilateral agreement of
limited scope (e.g., goods only, central governments only,
higher threshold values for developing countries) would pave
the way for deeper cooperation as time goes on.

37

World Trade Organization, Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement – Report of the Meeting of 18 June 2003 – Note by the
Secretariat, 7 July 2003 (WT/WGTP/M/18 para. 12 and para. 13).
38

This view has been expressed by Canada. See World Trade Organization, Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement – Report
of the Meeting of 18 June 2003 – Note by the Secretariat, 7 July 2003
(WT/WGTP/M/18 para. 32).
39

This is a view expressed succinctly by the Japanese delegation. See
World Trade Organization, Working Group on Transparency in Government
Procurement – Japan’s View on Transparency in Government Procurement –
Communication from Japan, 14 October 2002 (WT/WGTP/W/37).
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Trade and Investment
International regime theory confirms the most obvious argument in support of formal discussions on the interface between
trade and investment. The large number of bilateral investment
treaties that already exist constitute an intricate, uneven and still
incomplete set of regulations for international investors. A multilateral agreement (presumably one that goes beyond the minimalist Trade-Related Investment Measures, or TRIMs, agreement reached in the Uruguay Round) could therefore, in principle, reduce transaction costs, both for governments in establishing a seamless set of rules and for businesses in navigating in
the resulting environment.40
As well, consistent with the function of an international regime to provide information to its members to reduce monitoring and other transaction costs, a fundamental principle of any
agreement would presumably be transparency. This in itself
does not appear to pose problems of a sort not already encountered and overcome in other fields by the GATT/WTO. For example, the TRIMs agreement already requires mandatory notification of all non-conforming trade-related investment measures
and establishes a Committee to monitor the implementation of
commitments under the agreement.41
Nor would there appear to be any particular issues raised by
extending the fundamental disciplines of the WTO—national
treatment and most favoured nation (MFN) commitments, to40

The TRIMs agreement provides that no contracting party shall apply
any TRIM inconsistent with Articles III (national treatment) and XI (prohibition of quantitative restrictions) of the GATT, and requires elimination of all
non-conforming TRIMs within two years for developed countries, within
five years for developing and within seven years for least-developed. Included is an illustrative list of TRIMs agreed to be inconsistent with these
articles including local content requirements and trade balancing requirements. See World Trade Organization, Legal texts: the WTO agreements,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#gproc,
accessed
April 24, 2004.
41

Ibid.
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gether with binding of policies. The TRIMs agreement and the
hundreds of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that have been
signed which typically provide for national treatment are testimony that the basic elements of the GATT/WTO regime can be
extended with little or no resistance. Going even just this far
and no further with a multilateral agreement might serve the
useful purpose of reducing investor uncertainty and thereby reducing risk premia.42
But going any further seems to raise any number of issues.
First, investment rules overlap significantly with the GATS
Mode 3: commercial presence. Under this mode of services
trade, a service is supplied through the establishment of a commercial organization in a consumer’s country of residence. Establishing a commercial presence requires investment. The negotiated commitments under investment would accordingly
have to parallel those made in services, which specify actual
commitments (positive list approach) rather than making broad
commitments and listing exceptions. But since foreign direct
investment is almost universally sought after for goods sector
production,43 this immediately brings into question the value
42

See J. Francois, 1997, “External Bindings and the Credibility of Reforms, in A. Galal and B. Hoekman, Regional Partners in Global Markets,
London, Centre for Economic Policy Research, and R. Fernandez and J.
Portes, 1998, “Return to Regionalism: An Analysis of the Nontraditional
Gains from Regional Trade Agreements,” World Bank Economic Review,
Vol. 12, pp. 197-220.
43

For example, nations engage in policies such as tax competition to attract foreign direct investments (FDI)—while this can create positive externalities such as technological spillovers for local firms, it can have negative
spillovers on other countries and result in excessive payment to the investor
leading to an inefficient outcome for the world as a whole. See Theodore
Moran, 1998, Foreign Direct Investment and Development, Washington,
DC, Institute for International Economics. Also see B. Aitken and A. Harrison, 1999, “Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment?”
American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No 3, pp. 605-18, and K. Saggi, 2000,
“Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and International Technology Transfer:
A Survey,” Policy Research Working Paper No 2349, Washington, DC,
World Bank. The problem here is not prying open markets, but rather establishing disciplines on “beggar thy neighbour” behaviour—i.e., obtaining
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added of an investment agreement if the main area where it
would have a liberalizing effect is in services, which is already
being addressed under the GATS.
Second, to reduce transactions costs significantly, a multilateral agreement would have to supplant the current patchy
mosaic with, in Sylvia Ostry's words, “a more uniform set of
rules with broader application, and particularly rules that will
limit the frequent exclusions taken in investment treaties for
‘domestic laws, regulations, and policies.’”44 And the last bit of
that quote represents of course the can of worms that has made
an agreement on investment so difficult: investment touches on
a plethora of domestic laws, regulations and policies. To drill
down beyond national treatment and MFN is to almost immediately hit a nerve—or several. For example, investment touches
on property rights: any intrusion of an international rule into
domestic law in this area where the status quo invariably reflects a finely tuned balance between individual, corporate and
state interests is an intrusion into a minefield, as illustrated by
controversies that have been raised in respect of NAFTA Chapter 11 which provides recourse to the courts for changes in government policies unavailable to domestic investors.45
agreement on what type of incentives should be permitted and what types
constrained. This is a potential minefield for international rules since the
harsh realities of economic geography (where the "core" is a privileged recipient of FDI compared to the "fringe") lead to unequal results when equal
rules are applied (to paraphrase Amartya Sen). The significance of this issue
has been questioned: political stability, labour costs, and a strong infrastructure have been found more likely to attract FDI. See D. Wheeler and A.
Mody, 1992, “International Investment Location Decisions: The Case of US
Firms,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 33, pp. 57-76.
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This issue has been front and centre for the various nongovernmental organizations, largely environment and development-oriented,
that have opposed negotiating investment rules going back to the protests
against the OECD-sponsored initiative for a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI). These groups worry that an agreement would give “investors too much scope to oppose and circumvent governments’ regulation
aimed at social or environmental objectives through provisions on investors-
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This highlights the risks that would be encountered by having investment as part of an international regime. Regimes facilitate issue linkage, which in this instance would allow concessions in other areas to provide leverage for movement on
investment rules.46 But unlike the situation with tariff cutting,
the trade-offs might not always be between competing commercial interests but between commercial interests and issues that
particular societies have chosen to leave outside the commercial
realm. Succinctly put, the core concern of those “outside the
fences,”47 is not that the WTO agreements will open up markets
where they already exist, but that they will introduce markets
where they do not exist. The remaining feature of an international regime to discuss in this connection, namely its capacity
to deflect domestic lobby pressures, may not actually deflect
pressures in this type of circumstance but simply arouse a storm
of protest aimed at the WTO.

State dispute resolutions." See Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p. 424. See
also S. Kobrin, 1998, “The MAI and the Clash of Globalization,” Foreign
Policy, Vol. 112, pp. 97-109, and Mark Vallianatos et al., License to Loot:
The MAI and How to Stop It, Washington, DC, Friends of the Earth.
[http://www.foe.org/res/pubs/pdf/loot.pdf].
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This is even hinted at in the name of the working group, which is not
‘investment liberalisation,” but “relationship between trade and investment.”
By creating linkages between trade and investment policies, national leaders
could promote a liberal agenda by “tying their hands” to an international
agreement. Specifically, “an agreement can be a valuable tool for governments that are hostage to local incumbents that oppose foreign entry by being part of a ‘grand bargain’. As FDI and trade are increasingly two sides of
the same coin, rules should focus on the full set of policies that affect actors’
decisions – both trade and investment-related regulations." Hoekman and
Kostecki, 2001, p. 420.
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To borrow a term popularized by Naomi Klein to depict protesters
who advocate an alternative vision of globalization. See Naomi Klein, 2002,
Fences and Windows: Dispatches from the Front Lines of the Globalization
Debate, New York, Picador USA.
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Trade and Competition Policy
Competition policy would appear to be the fourth seed amongst
the Singapore four, being the least advanced in terms of achieving consensus on scope and having all the intrusiveness of investment without the major offsetting attraction of larger FDI
inflows which an investment agreement implicitly promises-the benefits flowing from enhanced competition are with rare
exceptions48 diffuse, long-term in nature and hard to directly
attribute to specific instruments or policy interventions.
Competition policy is far from new to the WTO: several
existing agreements already contain related provisions including
the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), the TradeRelated Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the GATS and the
Telecommunications Reference Paper. Under TRIMs and
GATS, members are only obligated, on request, to enter into
consultations with a view to eliminate business practices that
are deemed to restrict trade. There is no requirement to act, only
an obligation to provide information.
To go further, an agreement on trade and competition
would have to establish some points of commonality without
going so far as to attempt harmonization of national laws
(which has been categorically rejected as an objective of the
exercise49). The work has thus aimed to establish "a set of prin48

For example, one might see immediately lower prices in the wake of
the break-up of a cartel.
49

As the Working Group put it in its report to the General Council in
2003, "..because markets and culture were inseparable, and differed from
country to country, … a multilateral framework on competition policy would
have to take cognisance of, and accommodate, a substantial degree of pluralism in national competition policies, especially among developing countries, in addition to other, sometimes more interventionist, policies that existed to support development." (emphasis added). See World Trade Organization, "Report (2003) of the Working Group on the Interaction Between
Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council", WT/WGTCP/7, 17
July 2003; at para 18; also see para 16. This position is buttressed by theoretical considerations: because of differing social preferences, it is not clear
that international harmonization of market regulation will increase welfare.
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ciples that would embody common values and promote cooperative approaches to competition law enforcement that were in
the interest of all Members, while respecting the extensive differences that prevailed in economic and legal circumstances and
cultures."50 And insofar as the implementation of a competition
regime mandated by multilateral obligations would present an
administrative burden for developing countries, the additional
WTO principles of flexibility and progressivity of frameworks
would come into play, supported by technical assistance and
capacity building pursuant to commitments made at Doha.51
Assessing prospects for forward movement is difficult. On
the one hand, some delegations have pointed out that their competition laws and/or policies are already consistent with the
WTO core principles of non-discrimination, transparency, and
due process—which in fact have been described as universal
principles of sound governance—without in any way compromising their ability to tailor their legislation to address their
own particular circumstances. Indeed, in the deliberations of the
Working Group, it has been suggested that developed countries
should unilaterally commit to the core principles since most
would face few compliance issues.52 Yet, in the deliberations of
the Working Group, there has been much probing into the operational implications and possible broad ramifications of signing onto such obligations. And the concerns here have not only
According to Hoekman and Kostecki (2001, 415-16), “in contrast to trade
policy – where there are clear-cut policy recommendations – when it comes
to regulation and market structure there are few hard and fast rules of thumb
that governments can rely on to ensure that agreements enhance welfare. In
part, this is because different interests are affected when it comes to regulation […]. Preferences across societies will differ across countries depending
on local circumstances, tastes, and conditions.” (emphasis added).
50
World Trade Organization, "Report (2003) of the Working Group on
the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council", op cit.; at para 16.
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Ibid, at para 21.
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Ibid. at para 22.
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the developing countries cautious of taking on administrative
obligations that would be costly or otherwise burdensome. The
US, for example, has sought clarification of the meaning of
"transparency" in terms of reporting requirements in respect of
the hundreds of relevant cases each year at all levels of the federal judiciary.53 Common law countries have questioned the interpretation of the non-discrimination principle in their context
where "the 'law' consisted of both statutes written in broad language and judicial decisions interpreting such statutes?"54
The difficulty in achieving consensus on this issue, despite
every evidence of serious engagement and informed debate
within the Working Group (not to mention within the OECD
which has been grappling with this issue for many years),
would appear to reflect in part the myriad issues raised by the
general intrusiveness of international rules (in this area or others) and in part by the complexity of the subject matter in this
particular area which in turn reflects the non-specificity of the
concept of competition policy.
While the problem of intrusiveness is perhaps best illustrated by the sheer number of detailed concerns raised by different parties, one example suffices to bring out the difficulty of
establishing even an apparently universal principle such as "fair
and equitable procedure": As the working Group has acknowledged, ".. this was a particularly difficult subject area because
notions of fundamental fairness in the context of law enforcement disciplines such as competition law differed across legal
systems." 55 Some of the questions raised in the Working Group
about the interpretation of procedural fairness have included the
following: Would rights extend solely to those subject to adverse decisions? Would third-parties have rights in some cases?
Would a right to appeal administrative decisions by competition
authorities include the review of decisions not to pursue complaints?
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In the particular case of competition policy, these problems
are compounded by the uncertainty about scope. A narrow interpretation of the relationship between trade and competition
policy would limit the focus to competition laws; these typically
include provisions against anti-competitive market behaviour
(e.g., abuse of dominant market position and collusive practices
such as cartels) and anti-trust provisions applying in respect of
mergers and acquisitions. A broader interpretation would include “the set of measures and instruments used by governments that determine the conditions of competition that reign on
their markets.”56 These could, for example, include privatization
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), deregulation of markets, and
controls on subsidy programs. Many of the issues raised in the
Working Group's deliberations are with the ramifications for
areas such as industrial policy (e.g., that the non-discrimination
principle not somehow reach into policies to nurture development). The responses in the Working Group to these kind of
concerns include pointing to the ability to list exceptions and
also to a distinction between de jure and de facto violations of
the non-discrimination principle: only the former would be addressed in the proposed multilateral framework, because, addressing de facto instances of discrimination could introduce "a
host of problems."57 At the same time, reflecting the usual point
of the devil being in the detail, the Working Group noted "As to
the concerns expressed regarding how the distinction between
de jure and de facto violations would work in practice, the point
was made that it was difficult or impossible to provide definitive answers to the kinds of detailed questions which had been
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Hoekman and Kostecki, 2002, p. 425. In the context of the discussion
in the Working Group, it has been pointed out that eschewing to enact a
competition law, which small, very open economies such as Hong Kong
have chosen to do, is not the same as not having a competition policy.
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World Trade Organization, "Report (2003) of the Working Group on
the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council", op cit.; at para 26.
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posed concerning a prospective legal text before a negotiation
had begun."58
These sorts of issues are not new, of course, in the WTO,
having already been breached in the context of previous agreements (e.g., the GATS) without forcing harmonization of laws.
What then might international regime theory have to say about
the prospects for progress in this area?
First, it might be noted that the sustained process of discussion of this issue since the formation of the Working Group following the Singapore WTO Ministerial is itself an illustration of
the way the WTO as an international regime is promoting cooperation. Discussion and sharing of experiences is after all a preliminary form of cooperation.
Secondly, as the exchange of information within the Working Group has served to highlight, the Nordic countries have
recently provided a quintessential example of progressive international cooperation in this subject area. Cooperation among the
Nordic competition authorities started in the late 1970s/early
1980s with biannual meetings of the heads of the national competition authorities simply to discuss topics of mutual concern.
This led to the establishment in 1998 of a committee to propose
ways to deepen cooperation. In 2000 the parties adopted
non-binding guidelines regarding the exchange of
non-confidential information and co-ordination in carrying out
investigations, including making so-called "dawn raids" on each
other's behalf. Pursuant to these initiatives, practical cooperation has in fact deepened, with information exchange and coordination of investigations having become routine in all impor-
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Ibid. at para 31. It was also pointed out in the Working Group's deliberations that, to the extent compliance with the WTO regime in respect of,
say, the hard-core cartel issue were tested under the dispute settlement
mechanism, it would be the presence on the statutes of the country of a law
against such cartels, not whether the law was being enforced, that could be
the basis of a complaint. Insofar as the WTO obligations were enforceable,
peer pressure aside, it would be through the DSU.
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tant competition cases, with positive results, particularly with
respect to hardcore cartel cases.59
This experience illustrates the importance that IRT attaches
to establishing a minimal extent of cooperation as the basis for
deeper cooperation as mutual trust is built through repeated exchanges. The Nordic experience also illustrates the importance
of even apparently shallow forms of cooperation (e.g., exchange
of non-confidential information) and patience with gradual progress. Considered in this light, and considering the diversity of
the WTO's membership compared to the Nordic community, the
WTO's progress on this issue since the Singapore Ministerial
might well be judged to be very good.
IRT also suggests that the approach being mooted with the
Working Group is sound: proactive engagement by developed
countries would "entice developing countries to willingly join
the multilateral competition structure, and establish the foundation for regional cooperation."60 This is but a successful regime
expanding by demonstrating its value.
Such gradual accretion of members would be supported by
technical assistance and capacity building, illustrating again the
capacity of the WTO regime to alter the payoff of a game.
One standard function of an international regime would
have to be used carefully since in some cases it would appear to
be in distinctly counter-productive, namely the use of the WTO
to deflect domestic pressures. Insofar as the WTO were leaned
on to take action against injurious anti-competitive practices in
the domestic sphere, this would be consistent with the standard
benefit of an international regime. However, if the WTO were
used to justify introduction of competition laws in the face of
competing objectives in the social domain, it would be open to
criticism that might be difficult to answer given the difficulty of
making tradeoffs between social and economic objectives. As
Hoekman and Kostecki note: “while governments may seek to
agree on common regulatory principles to govern behavior of
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public entities or restrict the use of domestic policies, this is
best done directly and should not be made a precondition for
trade liberalization.”61
Overall, the promotion of international cooperation in the
field of competition policy can benefit through a WTO initiative
to address the interface between trade and competition policy.
The caveat is that patience is likely to be especially important in
this domain.
Conclusion
Five major conclusions emerge from consideration of the Singapore issues through the lens of international regime theory.
First, the WTO is in many ways the quintessential international regime; the introduction of the Singapore issues onto its
agenda is in many ways a reflection of its past success.
Second, the WTO is well placed as an international regime
to promote international cooperation in the subject areas addressed by these issues. Many of the functions of an international regime lend themselves well to building cooperation in
respect of each.
Third, insofar as IRT emphasizes the importance of small
beginnings, patient confidence building through shallow forms
of cooperation such as information exchange, and gradual deepening of cooperation, it is premature to declare failure on the
Singapore issues because a formal launch was not agreed at
Cancún; indeed, to do so would be to completely overlook the
cooperation that is already "in the bank" in the form of the deliberations of the Working Groups since their inception following the Singapore Ministerial.
Fourth, insofar as these issues are to be advanced through
linkage to other issues, it is not at all evident that being bundled
together was an asset; the effective unbundling of these issues at
Cancún may therefore represent an important positive develop-
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ment in terms of allowing each to be linked into trade-offs with
other issues on its own merits.
Fifth, seen through an IRT lens, the Singapore four are
quite different in terms of the problems that must be overcome
to build cooperation. There is no good reason to believe that
each of these issues has the same "gestation period" in terms of
confidence building before being ready to move to the stage of
formal obligations. Accordingly, there was no inherent reason
to expect that they could be advanced in lockstep. By the same
token, the differentiated timetable going forward that was implicit in the compromise proposal put forward at Cancún by the
facilitator for the issues represents a positive development in
moving towards a process better suited to each.
Launching formal negotiation on some or all of the Singapore issues at the Cancún would have reinforced the WTO regime, held out the promise of early benefits for WTO members
individually and the global economy as a whole, and hastened a
deepening of multilateral cooperation that is likely to prove inevitable in the longer run. At the same time, inclusion of these
issues in an inadequately prepared form on the Doha Development Agenda as a bundled group subject to the single undertaking would have carried its own risk for a timely completion of
the round.
So to answer the question in the title of this chapter: should
we be cheering for the demise of the Singapore issues? The answer to which the analysis above leads is rather that we should
cheer for the liberation of the Singapore four from a bundling
that was probably unsustainable and that could have constituted
a poison pill for the Doha Development Agenda. Each can now
be considered on its own merits and allowed to mature at its
own pace. The very real record of international cooperation
achieved since the Singapore Ministerial is the main payoff to
the 1996 initiative. None of that was lost at Cancún ; it serves
as the base from which to move forward.
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